In May 2025, Shiloh Hendrix took her child to a park in Rochester, Minnesota. A nine-year old Somali boy tried to steal something from her handbag, and Hendrix reacted by calling him the n-word.

An adult bystander, a Somali man called Sharmake Omar, then confronted Hendrix while filming her with his phone. The ensuing video shows Hendrix trying to leave, with her toddler in one arm, as Omar followers her, admonishing her for using a slur and urging her to repeat the n-word into his camera. Hendrix obliged the man, and then turned to continue walking away.

The entire video is about thirty seconds long. Hendrix never raises her voice, we never see her say anything to the Somali nine-year old, or to any child. It is unclear whether she was overheard by any child other than her own whom she was carrying.

The incident generated a lot of public outcry at the time it occurred, both for and against Hendrix. She started a GiveSendGo that generated over $750K. Omar started a GoFundMe that generated close to $400K. On social media, Hendrix’s supporters pointed out that Omar and his brother had recently been criminally charged with raping a 16-year old foster home runaway. The month before the playground incident, the Olmsted County DA dropped those charges.

Voluntary dismissals by the State are governed by Minnesota Criminal Procedure Rule 30.01, which provides, “The prosecutor must state the reasons for the dismissal in writing.” The only reason given in the State’s one-page dismissal was “In the interest of justice.” People on social media are speculating that the case was dismissed by a liberal DA, to avoid an ICE detainer. I’m not sure how true that is. Sometimes in rape cases the victim is not a cooperative witness.

Anyway, Olmsted County prosecutors charged Hendrix with two counts of misdemeanor public disorder. This month, she was tried and convicted of public disorder toward Omar, and (oddly) acquitted of public disorder toward the nine-year old boy who stole from her handbag. The trial lasted for four days—a pretty ridiculous length of time for a case like this. During the trial, we learned that the nine-year old boy wears an ankle monitor because of a history of serious misbehavior and his parents’ derelict supervision.

The statute Hendrix was convicted under is Minnesota Statutes § 609.72. Here it is, in all its glory:

§ 609.72 Disorderly Conduct

Subdivision 1. Crime.

Whoever does any of the following in a public or private place, including on a school bus, knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know that it will, or will tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or breach of the peace, is guilty of disorderly conduct, which is a misdemeanor:

(1) engages in brawling or fighting; or

(2) disturbs an assembly or meeting, not unlawful in its character; or

(3) engages in offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or noisy conduct or in offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.

A person does not violate this section if the person’s disorderly conduct was caused by an epileptic seizure.

Obviously, Hendrix did not engage in brawling or disturb a public meeting; and clause two of the statute has already been struck down by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which noted that, “a statute is substantially overbroad … if, in addition to prohibiting unprotected speech, it also prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.” State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 172 (Minn. 2017).

So the third clause of the statute is the one that was applied here: “engages in… offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.”

The list of antisocial behaviors this clause may apply to, as written, is bottomless. Obviously it “prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech,” including the n-word.

However, it appears that Olmsted County prosecutors made use of clause three in an effort to shoe-horn Hendrix’s alleged offense into the parameters of the “fighting words” doctrine. “Fighting words” are (technically) an exception to the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee, and are defined as words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 769 (1942).

The facts of the Chaplinsky case are not entirely clear, but essentially, in April 1940, a Jehovah’s Witness named Walter Chaplinsky was leafleting in downtown Rochester, New Hampshire. A crowd took offense to something he said about other religions, and gathered round as if to assault him. A police officer intervened but instructed Chaplinsky to back down, too. Chaplinsky responded by shouting at the officer, “You are a goddamned racketeer” and “a damned fascist” and “the whole government of Rochester are fascists.”

Chaplinsky was arrested, charged and convicted of a public disorder offense. The Supreme Court later upheld the conviction on the grounds that Chaplinsky had uttered “fighting words” unprotected by the First Amendment.

You’ll note that even this expansive doctrine (words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”) is quite a bit narrower than the language of clause three of the Minnesota statute Shiloh Hendrix was charged under (i.e., “offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.”)

Moreover, the idea of arresting someone for calling a police officer a “fascist” is pretty quaint—meaning, it’s questionable whether “fighting words” is even a thing in the 21st century. But of course that didn’t stop the Olmsted County DA:

According to KAAL, the judge said jurors would be deciding whether the alleged use of the slur toward the child could be considered “fighting words.” Per the outlet, fighting words are defined as words directed at a person that are likely to provoke a violent reaction.

The stock criticism of this doctrine is that it gives violent individuals a veto over what other people can say. In any case it appears unlikely that Hendrix’s conviction would survive appeal because, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in a more recent case, “this Court has not upheld a conviction under the fighting-words doctrine in 80 years.” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 77, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 2116 (2023). And one federal appellate court recently held that “even the most egregious racial slur is not a fighting word per se. The circumstances in which the word is used matter a great deal.” United States v. Bartow, 997 F.3d 203, 209 (4th Cir. 2021).

Here, Hendrix, with a toddler in her arms, was followed to her car by a strange man filming her and demanding that she repeat (for his camera) the slur she had earlier uttered to someone else. She was trying to get away from the guy and, given his (alleged) history, she may’ve been wise to get testy. In any case, unlike in Chaplinsky, no crowd gathered, and no violent reaction was provoked. Thus, even if one could argue that the statute Hendrix was charged under validly contemplates prosecution of words that genuinely cause violence, that’s not the reason why she was prosecuted.

Ultimately, what was being prosecuted in the Shiloh Hendrix case is obviously just a sentiment—an idea—that the government doesn’t like. Under the First Amendment, that can’t stand. Hendrix’s attorney has announced that he plans to notice an appeal. I wish him the best of luck.

If you have a defamation, doxxing, cyber-stalking, or First Amendment matter in Washington, New Mexico, or Texas, please visit my law practice at latenightlaw.com.

This blog post is commentary and is not legal advice for your individual situation. All text content © Aaron Cress 2025-2026.